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SOME COMMON PROBLEMS INCIDENT TO
DRAFTING DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS OF
DONATIVE INSTRUMENTS*
W. BRYAN BoLIcnt

In the short time allotted for this discussion of dispositive provisions
of wills and trusts, I shall not attempt to cover the waterfront but will
confine my remarks to certain common problems of drafting. Following some consideration of miscellaneous general problems, I shall deal
mainly with draftsmanship as related to class gifts and end limitations.
Thus I shall discuss neither the fact-gathering nor the tax-saving aspects
of estate planning, but will concentrate on methodology in the effectuation of certain schemes of property disposal. And for the most part I
can only bring you a professor's-eye view of the matter gained largely
in the legal dissecting room where we students conduct post mortems on
dispositive mistakes which reach courts of appeal.
I
KNow-How
Estate planning and drafting involve both knowledge and technique
--what to do and how to do it. The planner must, as a minimum, understand and evaluate not only the legal but the human factors in the
equation. He must be able to elicit confidential information about
family and property; and by furnishing ideas, to lead his client into
making only the wise and reasonable dispositions of which his estate is
capable; and above all else he must have the technical competence to
draft the instruments necessary to effectuate the plan. And this calls
for the possession by him of certain qualifications: (1) He must know
the local law on the subject, the statutes and the cases, especially the
significance which the courts give to particular words and phrases, and
always remember that by change of the donor's domicile and otherwise
the law of another jurisdiction may come to apply; (2) he must know
the available legal devices for effectuating various objectives and how
to use them, just as the good golfer must know which club to use for a
particular result and how to handle it; (3) he needs foresight and
* This article in substance reproduces a paper presented to the North Carolina
Bar Association's Institute on Tax and Estate Planning held in Chapel Hill on
December 17, 1955. Since the paper was read at the institute, it often speaks in
the first person, and for purposes of clarity, this usage has not been changed.
Footnotes have been added to replace citations in the text of the paper.
' Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
NECESSARY
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imagination to envisage and provide for the usual contingencies, of which
the average donor is almost completely oblivious; and (4) though he
need not be a stylist, he must be able to write with precision and
clarity so that the meaning of his language cannot be distorted by a
hostile reader. Perfect draftsmanship, which would avoid all construction problems, assumes an ability to express oneself so unambiguously
that everything one says means exactly the same thing to everyone else.
Unfortunately, neither man nor his language has reached that state in
the art of self-expression. Therefore the good draftsman must not only
know the formal legal rules but understand the judicial technique in
construction problems.1 And since this area of law is normally covered
only in Future Interests, it is a dictum of mine that no one should draft
a dispositive instrument of any complexity unless he has had that course.
Fortunately, the estate planner and draftsman of today has available
some excellent recent texts on the subject, both general and special. 2
II
THE LEGAL BACKGROUND
The artist has at his disposal all the colors of the spectrum which he
may mix as he sees fit, but the legal draftsman has only a certain number
of fixed types of estates and other interests, legal or equitable, present or
future. However, the common law's trust concept and system of limited
estates projected upon the plane of time-perhaps its most sophisticated
developments-do permit great elasticity in property settlements. In
the game of conveyancing, each interest, like men in a game of chess,
has its relative value and fixed characteristics. And once the troublesome problem of construction is disposed of property law has certainty,
i.e., when the type of estate or other interest is established the law
implies a more or less fixed group of legal consequences whether or not
they are intended by the creator. 3
In the effectuation of a dispositive plan by donative instrument we
encounter rules of law like the Rule Against Perpetuities, and rules of
construction such as the class-closing rules. Both reflect policy con2 3 POWELL, REAL

PROPERTY

§§ 316-318, esp. 318 (1952) ; Simes, The Meaning

of Heirs in Wills: A Suggestion in Legal Method, 31 MIcH. L. REv. 356 (1933)
discusses factors other than the language of a will which may affect its construction.
2 General: AMI.CAN LAW OF PROPERTY (1952); POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
(1949-1954); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936-1940); SIMES AND SIITH, FUTURE
INTERESTS (2d ed. 1956). Special: CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING (2d ed. 1956);
SHATTUCK AND FAPR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1953) ; STEPHENSON, DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUSTS, ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS (1952) ; STEPHENSON, DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUSTS, DIsPOsrrIV PROVISIONS (1955) ; TRACHTMAN,
ESTATE PLANNING (1951); TWEED AND PARSONS, ESTATE PLANNING (2d ed.
1955); WoRsMER, PERSONAL ESTATE PLANNING IN A CHANGING WORLD (6th ed.
1955).
Oliver, Tax Pragmatism and Property Rationalism, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 675,

675-689 (1942).
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siderations and in varying degrees limit freedom of disposition. But
they differ in that the effect of an otherwise applicable rule of construction may be defeated by the sufficient expression of a contrary
intent, while rules of law operate regardless of expressed intent to the
contrary if the fatal words attracting the rule have been uttered. 4 To
the extent that these rules have definiteness of meaning and consistency
of judicial application the skilled draftsman can draw a donative instrument certain to give effect to the desires of the donor and to avoid litigation as to the meaning and effectiveness of the instrument. Our concern as draftsmen is to avoid the proverbial search for intent by using
words of art and using them unequivocally. The prevalence of skilled
conveyancing and standardization of forms in England has produced
definiteness in these rules. In this country the absence of such standardization and the persistence of the dogma that no will has a brother
hamper the attainment of reasonable certainty and predictability in conveyancing, and tend to shift judicial emphasis from rules of construction
to actual intent.5 Since the types of estate plans and instruments to
effectuate those plans fall into fairly definite patterns, I think the lawyer
may well use carefully drafted forms of conveyance whenever they fit
the facts of his case. If this system is intelligently followed, it should
expedite the preparation of such documents and provide considerable
insulation against oversights and litigation.6 However, this suggestion
is made subject to the following qualification: "No clause should appear
in any will [or other instrument] drawn by you unless you individually
know precisely what it means, what object it is designed to accomplish,
what doctrine (if any) of the law it grows out of, and how it7 furthers
the testamentary [or other] intention of this particular client."
The lawyer must be alert to the fact that every period and power in
our long history since 1066 has left its mark on our property law.
Social and economic policies produced both rules of construction effectuating "intent" and rules of law defeating it, but stare decisis often perpetuates such rules long after the originating reasons have ceased to
exist and they may constitute booby traps for the unwary. That ogre,
the rule in Shelley's Case, was probably in origin simply the judicial
closing of a "tax" gap, but the rule of law hangs on today and by substituting a fee simple in the ancestor for a life estate in the ancestor with
reminder in fee in his heirs penalizes North Carolinians taxwise, by
eliminating the estate tax saving of the life estate and remainder concept,
and otherwise, especially by thwarting the conveyor's intent to limit the
' 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.2 (1952) ; 1 SIMES AND SMITH, Op. Cit.
supra note 2, § 467.
r 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY Div. III, Part III, Introd. pp. 1181-1188 (1940).
7' See Garwood, Drafting Wills and Trusts, 94 TRUSTS & ESTATES 807 (1955).
LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON THE LAW OF

WILLS 234 (2d ed. 1949 Rev.).
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ancestor to a life estate. One rule of construction which probably was
originated to repel the application of a rule of law defeating intent by
making an otherwise contingent remainder vested and therefore indestructible and transferable has ripened into the legal axioms that "the law
favors the early vesting of estates" and also their "early indefeasibility."
While application of these axioms facilitates alienation and validity under
the Rule Against Perpetuities,8 it produces certain unfortunate results
today and poses the question whether an express requirement of survival
to the date of distribution of a future interest may not be wise in most
cases. This may be accomplished either by making the interest subject
to a condition precedent of survival or vested subject to defeasance by
non-survival. 9 The latter course seems safer because it eliminates certain
adverse common law aspects such as the doctrine of destructibility of
contingent remainders. If T devises property to his son, A, for life with
remainder in fee to A's children, if the remainder is vested rather than
contingent on survival, it is subject to the claims of creditors,' 0 may be
more readily sold by the remainderman," and if transmissible as part
of a child's estate it is generally subject to another estate tax and probate
expenses' 2 and may get out of T's family by descent or devise from the
remainderman.' 3 If the draftsman discloses these facts to his client, and
he should do so, it is probable that the average donor would desire such
remainder to be subject to a requirement of survival.1 4 If the limitation
had read in effect to my son, A, for life, remainder in fee simple to such
of his children as are living at his death and the then living descendants
per stirpes of such of A's children as may have died at any time before
A's death, the unfortunate consequences mentioned above would not
likely have occurred.
III
S6inE MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL PROBLEMS
As we all know, there are certain common problems as to disposition which the draftsman must reckon with and provide for, or let his
client chance the possibility of an unfortunate occurrence. I shall mention some of them.
1. The no-contest clause. Whether such a provision should be in83 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 243 Comments i, j (1940).
' See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.31 (1952).
"°Johnson Bros. v. Lee, 187 N. C. 753, 122 S. E. 839 (1924) ; Watson v. Dodd,
68 N. C. 528 (1873). But see Bodenhamer v. Welch, 89 N. C. 78 (1883).
"1Brown v. Guthery, 190 N. C. 822, 130 S. E. 836 (1925) ; Woody v. Cates, 213
N. C. 792, 197 S. E. 561 (1938).
12

Coddington v. Stone, 217 N. C. 714, 9 S. E. 2d 420 (1940).

Early v. Early, 134 N. C. 258, 46 S. E. 503 (1904).
See generally, Schuyler, Drafting, Tax and Other Consequences of the Rule
of Early Vesting, 46 ILL. L. REV. 407 (1951) ; 3 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 1,
§-318.
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serted will ordinarily depend upon the individual situation as to the
testator, his property, family, beneficiaries, and the devises and legacies
made. North Carolina has heretofore been most liberal in allowing
forfeitures for violation of no-contest clauses, but has recently adopted
the rule denying forfeiture where there is probable cause for contesting
the will and it is done in good faith.1 5 Since the purpose of the clause
is to prevent contest, if it scares off the beneficiary that is accomplished
whether the clause is void or valid. Of course, if a lawyer is consulted
deterrence will likely be commensurate with the probability of a court's
enforcing the forfeiture.
2. Lapse. Unless beneficiaries are explicitly required to survive the
testator, the anti-lapse statute provides for a substitute taker in certain
cases of death between the date of the will and the testator's death,
which statutory substitute is the issue of the beneficiary if he is a lineal
descendant or would have been an heir of the testator.16 Such clauses
as "to A if he survive me," or "to the children of A who survive me"
will settle the matter satisfactorily provided a substitute taker is named
to prevent a possible partial intestacy.
3. After-born or adopted children. Failure to provide for them by
express inclusion or exclusion in the will may upset your plans by having
such child take an intestate 18sharelT and a substitute gift outside the
probate estate may not work.
4. Buying-off the widow. As we know, if she exercises her right
of dissent from her husband's will she receives her statutory rights; i.e.,
dower, 19 year's allowance, 20 and her half 2' or child's share of the personal
property. 22 Of course, no clause can eliminate this privilege and she
must be bought off to prevent disruption of the testamentary plan. It
seems always desirable to provide expressly in the will that the provision
for her is in lieu of all marital property rights, and it might be expeditious to set up alternative provisions in the will in case the wife does
dissent in view of the problems incident to acceleration and sequestration.
5. Simultaneous Deaths. Since the Uniform Act is the law of this
state 23 its provisions will operate unless expressly excluded and the
draftsman must therefore make an election which can only be intelli" Ryan v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 235 N. C. 585, 70 S. E. 2d 853
(1952); Note 21 U. CIN. L. REv. 521 (1952). And see Whitehurst v. Gotwalt,
189 N. C. 577, 127 S. E. 582 (1925).
10 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-42.1, 42.2, 42.3 (1950).
17
1d. § 31-5.5.
Note
8 Williamson v. Williamson, 232 N. C. 54, 59 S. E. 2d 214 (1950),
29 N. C. L. REv. 218 (1951).
11
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 30-5 (1950).
20
2 Id. § 30-15.
-1d. § 28-149.
23 Id. § 30-2. Phipps, Marital Property Rights, 27 RocKY MT. L. REv. 180
statutes of all the states.
(1955) outlines theSTAT.
§§ 28-161.1-167.7 (1950).
23 N. C. GEN.
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gently done in the light of the effects of the statute. Tax considerations
apart, principal purposes of the ordinary survivorship clause are to
keep property out of the estate of the other person, and to prevent litigation as to who survived or the operation of an anti-lapse statute. A
time clause such as the following seems safest: "For the purpose of this
my will no legatee or devisee shall be deemed to survive me if he dies
within thirty (30) days of my death." This clause is preferred because
it eliminates most of the uncertainties inherent in the simultaneous death
and common disaster clauses. 24 Conjunction of simultaneous death
and anti-lapse statutes may allow a disposition to a beneficiary even
though the testator is presumed to survive him. 25
6. Pouring Over. The amendable or revocable inter vivos trust has
come to be a rather widely used device in estate planning mainly because
of its non-finality and elasticity in meeting changing conditions as to
family and property.26 If the settlor of such a trust wishes by his will
to pour over into the trust part or all of his probate estate to be administered as part of the trust, this has raised serious legal questions
as to the Statute of Wills. 27 However, an excellent 1955 North Carolina statute effective July 1, 1955,28 settles the matter for us and permits
pour-over from one's will to such previously created inter vivos trust
as the trust stands at the settlor-testator's death, and revocation of the
trust before that event voids the pour-over.2 Since only the wealthy
can generally afford to create non-revocable inter vivos trusts, this statute
can be of aid to the average person. The pour-over provision must
sufficiently identify the trust and a clause of the trust should empower
the trustee to receive additional property.
In addition to its other advantages, this device can curtail publicity
as to one's estate, reduce probate costs, and eliminate court supervision.
Use of this device will tend to reduce the importance of the will, and
it is not unlikely that strict construction of the act may ensue. Under
the English rule such a trust must be more than nominal. 0
7. Abatement. Most wills should probably contain a general or
specific abatement clause reducing pro rata all or certain gifts to take
care of the ever-present problem of shrinkage of one's ultimate estate
resulting from such causes as the fortunes of a business, the economic
" See Bowe, Draftsmanship: Wills and Trusts, 94 TRUSTS & ESTATES 797
(1955).
" Baltimore v. White, 189 Md. 571, 56 A. 2d 824 (1948).
="SHATTUCK AND FARe, op. cit. supra note 2, c. 4 and 6.
. TSee Comment, 39 VA. L. REV. 817 (1953).
.N. C. GEN. STAT.

§ 31-47 (1955).

See 33 N. C. L. REV. 598 (1955). For a liberal decision sanctioning a
revocable, amendable inter vivos trust, see Ridge v. Bright, 244 N. C. 345, 95
S. E. 2d 607 (1956).
" See STEPHENSON, DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUSTS, DIsPosITV PROVISIONS,
2

op. cit. supra note 2 c. 19 (1955).
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cycle, and taxation. For example, T might at the date of his will have
a million dollar estate and leave $100,000 to charity and the residue to
his family; and when he dies years later find his whole net estate is only

$100,000.3 1
8. "Reno" Clause. In these days of migratory divorces, it seems
very desirable to insert some protective provisions as to validity of such
divorces, ensuing marriages and issue thereof. A suggested provision
is hereinafter given in connection with the discussion of class gifts.
IV
DRAFTING CLASS GIFTS

Gifts to unborn or unascertained beneficiaries are made possible by
the class gift concept, the essence of which is a gift to a described group
capable of numerical fluctuation by increase or decrease. 32 Its original
function was to provide survivorship by implication among the described
group so as to prevent a lapse in case of a testamentary gift.

That the

class gift isused in a large percentage of all wills and trusts is obvious
when it is remembered that it embraces gifts by group designation to
persons such as children, grandchildren, brothers and sisters, nieces and
nephews, family, issue and heirs. And the vast volume of litigation
concerning the meaning of these terms alone raises the red flag of
danger for every draftsman as to the imprecision of language in such
legal documents and its consequent unpredictableness in this field. Who
constitute the class, when the class closes, shares of each member, and
whether a member must survive the date of distribution in order to take
are principal problems for the draftsman of class gifts. Because of the
ambiguities inherent in the concept, it should probably be used only
when legally necessary, i.e., when the individual gift will not suffice.
33
The general literature is both exhaustive and excellent.
While only a "lay" lawyer would get caught, there are certain groupsounding phrases which limit the duration of estates and give no interest
by purchase to the heirs of the named person, e.g., the traditional common law formulas for creating respectively the fee simple and the fee
tail are "to A and his heirs" and to "A and the heirs of his body." Also,
the rule in Shelley's Case makes void a remainder to the heirs of the
grantee life tenant, 34 and the doctrine of worthier title may render void
a remainder to the heirs of the grantor.35
1
Id.c. 2, Topic C.
3'3
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 279 (1940).
335 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 22.1-22.63 (1952); 3 PoWELM, op. cit.
supra note 1, §§ 351-357; 2 SIMES AND SMITH, op. cit. supra note 2, chs. 20-23;
Long, Class Gifts inNorth Carolina, 22 N. C. L. REv. 297 (1944).
"Martin v. Knowles, 195 N. C. 427, 142 S. E. 313 (1928).
" Therrell v. Clanton, 210 N. C. 391, 186 S. E. 483 (1936), Note, 15 N. C.
L. REv. 59 (1936).
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1. Who Constitute the Class. Even if it is assumed that most any
one of the common class gift expressions has been used in its primary or
ordinary sense, ambiguities of meaning still remain. A gift "to the children of A," involves the questions whether the following children are included: adopted, illegitimate, stepchildren, and those of different marriages. Likewise such gift to A's "issue" is not conclusive as to whether
it extends to legitimate blood descendants of the first and remoter degrees.
And a limitation to "the heirs of A" raises three problems as to their
ascertainmerit: what intestacy statute, of what date, and applied when."
And in North Carolina, such gift to the heirs of a living person is presumptively a gift to his children, 37 except when a life estate is limited
to the ancestor.38 As a matter of fact, when a layman uses the word
"heirs" in a conveyance drafted by him, he probably almost always
means children or grandchildren.
In class gifts to heirs, issue and the like, North Carolina is strongly
addicted to per capita distribution," although such takers be related to
the donor in different degrees, and if a per stirpital division is desired it
must be explicitly provided for. If a gift to heirs is a future interest,
the date for determining heirs of the named ancestor is a question of
40
construction and may be either his death or the end of the prior estate.
And whether an adoptee of A takes under a gift to A's children is
a question of intention and depends mainly upon whether such adop41
tion occurred before or after the date when the conveyance spoke.
Such are the definitional vagaries of these expressions, 42 that the
only safe course for the draftsman is to elicit from his client what meaning he wants to convey by such terms, 43 if you elect to use them, and
then to insert some such clause as the following:
For purposes of this instrument the terms "child" or "children"
mean legitimate blood descendants in the first degree of the parent
designated, and "issue" means legitimate blood descendants in the
first, second or any other degree of the ancestor designated, pro" See as to the three points, 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 22.30, 22.36,

22.56, 22.63 (1952) ; and Long, supra note 33, at 302-307.
"' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6 (1950); Ellis v. Barnes, 231 N. C. 543, 57 S. E.
2d 772 (1950) ; Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 58 (1950).
"sWhitley v. Arenson, 219 N. C. 121, 12 S. E. 2d 906 (1941).
"Coppedge v. Coppedge, 234 N. C. 173, 66 S. E. 2d 777 (1951), rehearing
denied, 234 N. C. 747, 67 S. E. 2d 463; Note, 30 N. C. L. REV. 197 (1952). And
see Freeman v. Knight, 37 N. C. 72 (1841).
"Grantham v. Jinnette, 177 N. C. 229, 98 S. E. 724 (1919) ; Ziegler v. Love,
185 N. C. 40, 115 S. E. 887 (1923); 3 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 1, § 375.
"1Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N. C. 572, 75 S. E. 2d 632 (1953), before; Wachovia
Bank and Trust Co. v. Green, 239 N. C. 612, 80 S. E. 2d 771 (1954), after; Note,
5 DUKE B. J. 60 (1955).
'"See Long, supra note 33 at 302-307; 2 SIMEs AND SMITH, op. Cit. supra note
2, §§ 721-724, 728-738.
5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 22.38 (1952).
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vided that the words "child" or "children" or "issue" of myself
or of any child of mine shall include every child legally adopted
by me or by any child of mine and such adopted child and its
issue shall be considered legitimate blood descendants of the
adopting parent and of any ancestor of such adopting parent;
and where a decree of divorce has been rendered by a court of
record and the spouses named therein have not thereafter lived
together openly as husband and wife, such divorce shall be
considered as valid for all purposes, including the following
purposes but without limiting the generality of the foregoing:
(1) the spouses shall no longer be considered as husband and
wife of each other or as heir, distributee or next-of-kin of each
other upon death; (2) if a spouse contracts a subsequent purported marriage which, apart from previous marriages, would
be valid, such subsequent purported marriage shall be considered as valid, the parties shall be considered husband and wife of
each other and heir, distributee or next-of-kin upon death and
every child of said marriage shall be considered a legitimate blood
descendant of such parents and of any ancestor of either of such
parents.
Whenever distribution of real or personal property is to be
made to designated "issue" on a per stirpes basis, or whenever
such property is devised or bequeathed to the "heirs" of a named
person, the property shall be distributed to the persons and in the
proportions that personal property of the named ancestor would
be distributed under the intestacy laws of North Carolina in force
at the time for distribution as if the named ancestor had died
intestate at such time, domiciled in such State, unmarried and
44
survived only by such issue or by such heirs, as the case may be.
The above clause should stand a fair chance in most cases of providing certain solutions for the uncertainties of terminology, status, and
property distribution it covers. As previously stated in my discussion of
general problems, the use of some such provision tailored to fit your
facts and in accord with your client's distributive desires is recommended. This particular form would certainly not be suitable if he
loves all of his issue per capita and not per stirpes and is opposed to
adoptions and divorces!
Although its uncertainties dictate against use of the expression, there
may be a class gift to a named person and a group ("to A and the
45
and the distribution in
children of B"), all constituting one class,
"'An adaptation from CASNER, EsrATE PLANNING pp. 337, 338, 376 (Supp.
1955).

113

RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

§ 284 (1940).
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North Carolina is normally per capita. 46 If the individual and the
described group are in the relation of parent and child we run afoul of
the rule in Wild's Case,47 both resolutions of which apply in North
Carolina. On a devise "to A and his children" if A has no children
at the date of the testator's death Resolution I gives A a fee tail which
is statutorily converted into a fee simple,48 while if he has one or more
children Resolution II makes A and his children in esse a single class
who take as tenants in common in fee simple to the exclusion of any
afterborn children. 49 If your client wants to convey property to A and
his children, the words "to A and his children" are unlikely to accomplish
a desirable objective. Resolution I facilitates alienation but not T's
intent, while Resolution II may conceivably be what T wants if all of
A's children can benefit. But most likely T wants successive ownership
as between A and his children which could be accomplished by a life
estate in A with remainder in fee simple to A's children. While legal life
estates to remainders are generally inadvisable as to personal property
because of its nature, a recent North Carolina statute now permits them
by inter vivos conveyance.5 0 And it might be said here that the legal
life estate in a parent with remainder to the children, especially in small
and uncomplicated estates, when such life estate includes a limited or
1
unlimited power of consumption, has its utility and advantages.r
2. When the Class Closes. An immediate class gift (to the children
of A) closes when the instrument speaks, i.e., when the deed is delivered
or the testator dies, 52 while a postponed class gift (to A for life remainder to the children of B) closes at the termination of the prior
estate or other period of postponement.53 The basic idea as to both
types is the same, namely, that as soon as the subject matter could be
distributed but for the possibility of additional members of the class,
considerations of convenience, such as early indefeasibility of title and
prompt administration of estates, demand the closing of the class, and
persons .begotten thereafter are excluded. 4 But these rules are subject
to the exception that as to a gift of an aggregate sum to a class (T bequeaths $15,000 to the children of A) if no member is in esse at the
"0Tillman v. O'Briant, 220 N. C. 714, 18 S. E. 2d 131 (1942).
'73 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 1, § 355; 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 283
(1940).
"Silliman v. Whitaker, 119 N. C. 89, 25 S. E. 742 (1896).
,0 Cullens v. Cullens, 161 N. C. 344, 77 S. E. 228 (1913).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 39-6.2 (1950) ; 31 N. C. L. Rav. 410 (1953); see SilEs
AND SMITH, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 353, 358, 359.
" See Comment, 28 N. Y. U. L. REv. 1162 (1953) ; 28 IND. L. J. 409 (1953).
023

RESTATEmET, PROPERTY § 294 (1940).

3

r1d. § 295.
1"3 PowELL, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 363-365.
applicable as to class gifts of income.

i (1940).

Such considerations are in-

3 RESTATEBIENT, PROPERTY § 295 comment
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date of distribution the class remains open during A's life ;55 but if each
is given a stated sum ($1,000 each to the children of A) the whole gift
fails in such case. 50 Otherwise the settlement of T's estate would be
postponed indefinitely. However, these are but rules of construction
which yield to a sufficient expression of a contrary intent. 57 And even
the rule in Rogers v. Mutch may be forced so to yield.58 Therefore,
unless these results comport with the donor's desires, it will be necessary
by special drafting so to conform the document. In any event, the
draftsman should always be explicit as to when the class shall close,
e.g., "to the children of A now living" would exclude afterborn; "to
the children of A now born or hereafter born during A's lifetime" would
include all of A's children; "to A for life remainder to the children of
B born before A's death," would explicitly exclude afterborn; "to A for
life remainder to the children of B who attain age 21" would normally
include only those born before B's eldest reached 21 and could call for
his share after A's death. To be general, yet explicit, you could say
"By children, I mean all children who are now living or born thereafter, up to the death of the life tenant," or "All children now living or
born thereafter up to the time when the first child attains the age of 21."
A gift "to the children of A to be distributed when the youngest
attains age 21" involves the possibility of the class closing at any one of
four dates, depending upon what "youngest" means. Literally, this
language keeps the class open till A dies, but the inconvenience of this
solution prompts the Restatement of Property to prefer closing whenever
the youngest of the class living at any one time attains age 21. 59
3. Survival to the Date of Distribution. Survivorship at least until
the death of the testator is characteristic of all testamentary class gifts
except insofar as an anti-lapse statute is operative.60 But from the
fact that a class can increase in membership until a future date (to A
for life remainder to the children of B; to the children of B 21 years
after my death) no inference is made that only such members of the
class as survive to such future date of distribution are entitled to take.
Only if, according to ordinary rules of construction, there is a condition precedent of survival, or a defeasance upon non-survival, to the date
of distribution will the membership of the class be subject to decrease
"Weld v. Bradbury, 2 Vern. 708 (1715); 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 294(b)
comment o (1940).
" Rogers v. Mutch, 10 Ch. D. 25 (1878); 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 294
comment q. and § 295 comment r (1940).
" Cole v. Cole, 229 N. C. 757, 51 S. E. 2d 491 (1949); Note, 28 N. C. L.
REv. 219 (1950).
"See Note, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 908 (1952).

"'3RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 295, comment k (1940) ; 2
op. '03
cit. POWELL,
supra noteop.2,cit.
§ 646.
supra
note 1, § 367.
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after the testator's death. 61 If the gift is to "heirs," "next of kin" or
"issue" of a living person, A, and these words are used in their technical sense, a condition precedent of survival to A's death, is generally
found; but the North Carolina decisions give the term "next of kin" the
02
now unusual meaning of nearest blood relations of the named person.
As previously stated, it is generally unwise to create an interest in
a class member or an individual that is not subject to a requirement
of survival to the date of distribution. In all cases the draftsman should
provide explicitly (1) whether there is a requirement of survival; (2)
if there is such a requirement, to what date the class member must
survive to meet the requirement; and (3) if there is such a requirement, what is to happen to the interest of the class member who fails to
meet the survival requirement. Thus "to A for life remainder to the
children of B who survive A and per stirpes to the issue of such children of B as shall die at any time prior to the death of A," would seem
to make all three points clear. As a draftsman, you can get any answer
you want under these rules of construction if you draft the document
03
to show an unambiguous intent to get that legal result.

4. End Limitations. While this expression is somewhat vague, it
has acquired the popular meaning of gifts over by way of substitution.
This may occur as to a primary beneficiary or may be the ultimate limitation after a series of gifts. This ultimate gift over is frequently to heirs
or distributees of the donor or another, or sometimes to the donor's
favorite charity. And these end limitations are generally limited to occur upon death without issue or words of similar import, such as a devise
"to A in fee but if he dies without issue then to B in fee" or "to A for
life, remainder to B in fee but if B dies without issue then to C in fee."
On these questions the number of cases runs into the thousands.0 4 Since
1827 North Carolina has had a statute 5 which presumes that the expression "die without issue" means definite failure of issue, i.e., failure
at some specific time, e.g., A's death. But the statute leaves open the
question whether it means A's death before the testator or whenever it
may occur. The latter is the rule of this state, 6 although there may be
an intermediate date between the testator's and A's death which is
used. 7 Such defeasance clauses are often used to keep property away
" Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Snyder, 235 N. C. 446, 70 S. E. 2d 578
(1952) ; 3 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 1, § 365; 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 296
(1940).
113 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 249 (1940); 3 POWNELL, op. cit. supra note 1,
§ 327; "next of kin," Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N. C. 158, 106 S. E. 501 (1921).
1S See 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 296, comment h (1940).
",2 PowN, op. cit. supra n. 1, §§ 263-272; 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 263-

272 (1940) ; 1
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op. cit. supra note 2, ch. 18.

6 N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-4 (1950).
Hales v. Renfrow, 229 N. C. 239, 49 S. E. 2d 406 (1948).
Christopher v. Wilson, 188 N. C. 757, 125 S. E. 609 (1924).
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from collaterals, and when that is the purpose the estate should remain
subject to defeasance until the owner's death, whenever that may occur;
but many cases adopt the substitutional construction and make the fee
68
absolute if the first taker survives the testator.
The principal ambiguities can be avoided by explicit drafting, such
as "to A in fee but if he die at any time, either before or after my death,
without children or remoter issue living at the time of his death, then
over to B in fee," or "to A for life, remainder to B in fee, but if B dies
at any time before the death of A and without children or more remote
issue living at the time of B's death then over to C in fee," or "to A
in fee but if A dies before my death and is unsurvived by children or
more remote issue living at his (A's) death then to B in fee." This
last insures the so-called substitutional construction and gives A an in69
defeasible fee simple if he survives T.
The problem of end limitations and accrued shares is tricky. T leaves
"the residue of my estate in trust to my wife for life, corpus at her death
to my three children, A, B, and C in equal shares. Should any of them
die before my wife unsurvived by issue, his portion shall pass to the
survivors of the said three children in fee." If A so dies without issue
his one-third goes to B and C. If B then so dies his original one-third
70
goes to C, but his accrued share does not and belongs to B's estate.
Since this is a rule of construction if you add to the above limitation
that "upon the death of any one of the above named persons who dies
unsurvived by issue then both his original and accrued shares shall go
over to the others of the original takers under this gift" you can avoid
the above result as to accrual shares.
5. The Rule Against Perpetuities. In view of the peculiar drafting
dangers incident to class gifts and the perpetuities problem, it seems desirable to make at least a passing reference to the Rule. The classic
statement is by Gray and it is generally approved.71 "No interest is
good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after
some life in being at the creation of the. interest." But for purposes of
this rule it is generally held that a class gift is not vested until it is
indefeasibly vested in all members. It is treated as a unit and both
the maximum and the minimum membership must be certain to be
determined within the period.72 If the interest of one class member can
1 SIMES AND SMITH, op. cit. mipra note 2, § 538.
"See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 266, cominent i (1940) ; 1 SIMFS AND SMITH,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 548.
7' Robertson

v. Andrews, 175 N. C. 492, 95 S. E. 892 (1918).
GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942) ; 4 RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 374 (1944); McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N. C.
737, 744, 68 S. E. 2d 831, 837 (1952).
"4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 371 (1944); 3 SIM-s AND SMITH, op. cit.
'

supra note 2, § 1265.
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vest too remotely the entire class gift fails, e.g., if T bequeaths property
"to A for life, remainder to such of her children as shall attain 25" and
A is alive at T's death the whole class gift is void although A is 75
and her youngest son is 50 because those in esse may die and the whole
class be ultimately composed of subsequently born children of A. 73 A
simple solution to this problem would be to make the limitation "to A
for life remainder to such of her children as shall attain 25 within 21
years after the death of the last survivor of all my descendants and A's
descendants living at my death." Or the limitation could read "to A for
life, remainder to her children, but if any child dies under 25, his share
shall pass to the survivors." This language makes the remainder vested
subject to defeasance and since the divesting gift over is too remote it
4
fails and leaves each child's remainder indefeasibly vested.
There are two exceptions to this general rule. A per capita gift
to members of a class may be part good and part bad. If T bequeaths
$100 to each child of A whenever born who attain age 25, this gift is
valid as to A's children in esse at T's death, and void as to those of the
class subsequently born. 75 The other exception is where a class is made
up of sub-classes. It may also be split. If T bequeaths property in
trust to pay the income in equal shares to the children of A for their
respective lives, and when each child dies to pay over the share of
corpus from which he has received the income in equal shares to his
issue then living, the remainders to issue of children of A in esse at T's
death are valid, and the others are void. 76
It is felt that because of the enormous volume of litigation concerning the vested or contingent character of future interests, no draftsman
should as a general practice rely on his belief that a particular future
interest is so vested as not to violate the Rule. It is far safer so to
draft that all of your remainders and executory interests become possessory within the perpetuities period.
" See McPherson v. Bank, 240 N. C. 1, 81 S. E. 2d 386 (1954) ; 3 SIMES AND
SMITH, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1229. Of course, the common law's conclusive presumption of capacity for childbirth ceases to be silly if one's children include
adoptees!
"' See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 71, § 108. And for other forms see 3 SIMEs
AND SMITH, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 1294-1297.
"4 RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 385 (1944); 3 SIZAES AND SMITH, Op. Cit.
supra note 2, § 1266.
"'4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 389 (1944) ; 3 SIstES AND SMITH, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 1267.

